SPECIFICATIONS
Span: 67 ft. 7 in.
Length: 52 ft. 11 in.
Height: 15 ft. 9 in.
Weight: 28,460 lbs. loaded
Armament: Five .50-cal. machine guns; 5,000 lbs. of bombs
Engine: Two
Wright R-2600s of
1,700 hp. ea.
Cost: $96,000
Serial Number: 43-3374 (B-25D)
Displayed as (S/N): 40-2344 (B-25B)
PERFORMANCE
Maximum speed: 275 mph.
Cruising speed: 230 mph.
Range: 1,200 miles
Service Ceiling: 25,000 ft.
(Source & courtesy
of:
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/air_power/ap5.htm)
B-25A & B-25B
As with all U.S. bombers in World War two, the
development of the B-25 is marked by increasing armament, more armor,
installation of self-sealing tanks, and, consequently, more weight. Until
engines were correspondingly up-rated, performance inevitably suffered.
Inadequate firepower in the nose and problems with gun turret
installations, issues seen in many bombers, also challenged the Mitchell's
designers.
The B-25A included pilot armor and self-sealing
tanks. The B-25B introduced the notoriously unsuccesful
Bendix
ventral turret.
Harold Maul, a B-25 crewman, described the ball turret in
Eric Bergerud's Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific:
"The worst thing ever designed was the bottom turret
of the B-25. It was the stupidest bit of equipment. My God, the operator is
sitting in one place getting a reverse image through a mirror. He couldn't
hit a thing. It slowed the damn plane down, and we weren't getting belly
attacks anyway.
What they really needed was a tail gun, which they eventually
installed."
North American B-25B Specs:
Engines: Two 1700 hp Wright R-2600-9 Double Cyclone
fourteen-cylinder air-cooled radials.
Maximum Speed: 300 mph at 15,000 feet.
Ceiling: 23,500 feet.
Range: 2000 miles with 3000 pounds of bombs.
Weight: 20,000 pounds empty, 28,460 pounds loaded,
31,000 pounds maximum.
Wingspan: 68 feet, Length: 53 feet
Fuel: 692 gallons. Provison for one 420-gallon drop
tank
Armament: One nose-mounted .30 caliber machine gun.
Four .50 calibers, a pair in two Bendix turrets (one top and
one bottom).
B-25C & B-25D
Between December, 1941 and May, 1943, North American
turned out 1,619 B-25C's, the first large-scale production version of the
Mitchell. The armament and the outward appearance of the "C" model closely
resembled the "B." Changes included improved carburetors, a cabin heater, a
larger (515 gallon) drop tank, a flame-dampening exhaust system, and
underwing bomb racks. In the way of weaponry, the single .30 caliber in the
nose was replaced by two .50's - one in the tip and one in the starboard
side.
The B-25D was essentially identical to the "C." 2290
were manufactured by North American at the government-owned plant in Kansas
City (ed. note - Some sources say that the B-25D was built at Dallas. Joe
Baugher says Kansas City. Case closed.)
An unusual character named Paul "Pappy" Gunn entered
the B-25 story in the South Pacific, in the Fifth Air Force's Third Bomb
Group. The relatively ancient Captain Gunn, 40 years old - thus the nickname
"Pappy," a master of the American "can do" spirit, modified a number of
aircraft for 5AF boss, General George Kenney. Gunn and his team transformed
the B-25, tossing out the useless ventral ball turret, removed the
bombardier position, and then added six forward-firing .50 caliber machine
guns. The resulting power of these massed .50 caliber machine guns was
awesome, and the 3rd BG's pilots used them to good effect, blasting away at
Japanese barges and shore targets.
A Zero caught by such a lead hailstorm simply exploded.
The field-modified B-25 strafers made their debut at the
Battle of the Bismarck.
Their murderous effect on the Japanese soldiers on the heavy
loaded troopships was terrible. World War Two was a tough proposition. For
better or worse, both sides knew it was a fight for national survival, and
they waged war accordingly. At the Bismarck Sea, the U.S. airplanes killed
as many Japanese soldiers as they could. Then, when the barges sank, and the
survivors leapt into the water or life-rafts, the B-25 and A-20 airmen
machine-gunned them. Not very pretty. I guess the kind of war that we have
more recently waged in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we answer to the U.N. for
every stray bullet and every "collateral damage," is more humane.
B-25G - The Big Gun
The "G" model featured a 75mm cannon in the nose, one
of the largest weapons ever mounted in an airplane. After extensive testing
at a secret base in California, the engineers made the idea work, but the
B-25G was not very successful. While it could carry 21 rounds, aiming the
big cannon was difficult, and it required a long "straight-in" run at the
target. During this run, the aircraft was extremely vulnerable and could
only get off four rounds. A number of B-25G's were modified by Pappy Gunn at
the Townsville Australia Modification Depot,
adding more machine guns and occasionally removing the 75mm cannon.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The Battle of the Philippine Sea
19-20 June 1944
by
David James
In September 1943 Japanese Imperial Headquarters resolved
that in the near future the entire strength of their fleet would be deployed
against the US Navy in a great decisive battle, and that in this battle the
enemy fleet would be destroyed "in one blow." By the Spring of 1944 Japanese
commanders had decided that the decisive encounter was imminent, and on 3
May the order for the operation - "A-Go" - was issued.
The A-Go Plan was based on the assumption that when the
great battle came about the American fleet would be carrying out an
offensive in the Central Pacific and that the Japanese would therefore have
the advantage of numerous island air-bases within range of the scene of
battle. The Japanese command knew that their forces would suffer from a
considerable inferiority in carrier airpower, and they were therefore
depending on their own land-based air-power to redress the balance.
On June 15 1944 the initial US
landings in the Marianas took place - on the island of Saipan. The Japanese
had been hoping and expecting that the American attack would come in the
Carolines or the Palaus, to the south of the Marianas, and closer to the
main Japanese sources of fuel. Their land-based aircraft had been disposed
accordingly - with relatively weak forces in the Marianas.
Thus the great operation began with
a setback for Japanese strategic hopes. Another blow to their expectations
was that the threat from American submarines restricted Japanese carriers to
their anchorage, so that they were unable to conduct proper flight training
in the run-up to the battle.
A preliminary US carrier strike in
the Marianas on June 11 persuaded Admiral Toyoda, C-in-C of the Combined
Fleet, that this was where the next landings would take place, and
accordingly Japanese forces began to converge on the Marianas for the
decisive battle. Their main groupings made rendezvous on June 16 in the
western part of the Philippine Sea and completed refuelling on June 17. By
the evening of that day Admiral Ozawa, commanding the Japanese forces, had
reasonably accurate intelligence of the composition of the US fleet. A few
minutes after midnight 17/18 June, Ozawa - in the tradition of the Japanese
Navy - issued a final exhortation to all the ships of his fleet :
"This operation has an immense
bearing on the fate of the Empire. It is hoped that all forces will do their
utmost and attain results as magnificent as those achieved in the Battle of
Tsushima."
Spruance's Decision
The Japanese forces had been sighted by American
submarines as early as June 15. By June 16 Admiral Spruance, commanding the
US Forces (the Fifth Fleet), was satisfied that a major sea battle was
approaching, and made plans accordingly. By the afternoon of June 18 Task
Force 58 (the Fast Carrier Task Force under Admiral Mitscher) was
concentrated near Saipan ready to meet the Japanese fleet.
More intelligence of the Japanese fleet's movements, from
submarines and radio intercepts, came in during June18. Shortly before
midnight 18/19 June Admiral Nimitz sent Spruance a message from Pacific
Fleet Headquarters indicating that the Japanese flagship was approximately
350 miles to the west-south-west of Task Force 58. Shortly afterwards
Mitscher sought Spruance's permission to head west during the night to what
- as Mitscher and his staff considered - would be an ideal launch position
for an all-out dawn air attack on the enemy force.
However, Spruance refused. Throughout the run-up to the
battle he had been concerned that the Japanese would try to draw his main
fleet away from the landing area using a diversionary force, and would then
make an attack around the flank of the US carrier force - an "end run" -
hitting the invasion shipping off Saipan. Such methods were a long-standing
part of the Japanese Navy's tactical doctrine .
Spruance was intensely conscious that protection of the
invasion shipping was his paramount responsibility, and should therefore
take precedence over the destruction of the Japanese fleet. Moreover, the
Admiral considered, as he was later to observe, that "if we were doing
something so important that we were attracting the enemy to us, we could
afford to let him come - and take care of him when he arrived." In effect
this was to be what happened during the battle.
Mitscher and his staff were aghast at Spruance's decision.
Captain Arleigh Burke, the Task Force 38 Chief of Staff, bitterly commented
that it "meant that the enemy could attack us at will at dawn the next
morning. We could not attack the enemy."
The Fifth Fleet Commander was adversely criticised by
many naval officers after the battle and continues to be condemned - by some
writers - to the present day. A still common allegation is that Spruance
decided as he did because he was not an aviator, and therefore must have had
an inadequate understanding of the principles of carrier warfare.
Initial Actions of 19 June
At dawn
- 0430 - on 19 June Task Force 58 was steaming E by N about 150 miles to the
WSW of Saipan and about 100 miles to the NW of Guam.
This huge fleet - with nearly 99,000 personnel on board -
was disposed in five groups - the four carrier groups and Admiral Lee's
Battle Line.
First came the three stronger carrier groups in a
north-south line abreast, with the centres of the groups 12-15 miles apart.
Due west of the middle group of this line steamed Task Group 58.7 - Lee's
Battle Line - with the weakest carrier group - Harrill's Task Group 58.4 -
sailing within visual distance to the north of it.
The carrier groups were each disposed in a circle four
miles in diameter (with the carriers in the centre of their respective
groups but having plenty of room for safe manoeuvering while under attack),
and the Battle Line was arranged in a circle about 6 miles in diameter, with
the battleship Indiana as guide at the centre of this circle. The
formation covered an area of sea roughly 35 miles by 25 miles.
At 0530 the task force turned north-eastwards, directly
into the wind, and began to launch combat air patrol, anti-submarine patrols,
and search missions. At 0619 Spruance ordered a change of course to WSW,
hoping thereby to place the fleet closer to the as-yet unlocated enemy
forces. But the carriers had to turn back into the wind whenever they were
launching aircraft, and at 10am Task Force 58 was in almost exactly the same
position as it had been at dawn.
The A-Go plan called for about 500 aircraft to be
available on the land bases in the Marianas. In fact - partly because of the
damage inflicted by the American carrier forces in strikes made between 11
June and 18 June - there were a mere 50 or so, all of them based on the
island of Guam.
The first attack of the day came at 0550 when a scouting
Zero from Guam attacked the picket destroyers of the Battle Line and was
shot down.
The next action took place over Guam when Hellcats from
the light carrier Belleau Wood, investigating a radar contact,
encountered Japanese aircraft taking off from Orote Field. At 0807 more
Japanese aircraft were detected by radar, heading towards Guam. These were
reinforcements flying in from other Japanese-held islands. Fighters were
vectored out to intercept them and there was continuous fighting over and
around Guam for nearly an hour. 35 Japanese aircraft were shot down, but
others were still taking off from Orote when the Hellcats received a "Hey
Rube!" signal (calling them back over the carriers) from the task force
flagship. Task Force 58 had detected large numbers of unidentified aircraft
approaching from the west. These were the planes of the first attack wave
from Ozawa's carriers, 68 or 69 aircraft in all.
Ozawa's Raids
The initial Japanese raid was detected by radar aboard
Lee's Battle Line at 1000 when still 150 miles distant. At 1023 Mitscher's
carriers turned into the wind, and began to launch every available fighter.
By this time Ozawa's first wave had approached to 70 miles. The Japanese
aircraft then began circling as they regrouped and prepared to attack. This
gave Task Force 58 ten minutes or more to complete its preparations to meet
them.
At about 1036 the first interception was made by 11
Hellcats from the carrier Essex. As these fighters, led by
Lt-Commander C.W. Brewer, were carrying out their attack they were joined by
other Hellcats from Bunker Hill, Cowpens and Princeton.
In this initial action at least 25 Japanese aircraft were shot down. Task
Force 58 lost only one fighter. This set the pattern for the air-to-air
combats of the day.
The Japanese planes which survived this interception were
met by other fighters and 16 more were shot down. Of the remainder some made
attacks on the destroyers Yarnall and Stockham, which were
operating as pickets for the Battle Line, but the Japanese aircraft caused
no damage. Three or four bombers broke through to the battleships, and one
made a direct hit on South Dakota which caused many casualties but
failed to disable her. Not one aircraft of Ozawa's first wave got through to
the American carriers.
At 1107 radar detected another and much larger attack.
This, Ozawa's second wave - consisting at this stage of 109 aircraft - was
met by American fighters sixty miles out from Mitscher's flagship
Lexington.
The first interception was made by 12 Hellcats, again
from Essex, led by Commander David McCampbell, who was to become the
highest-scoring US Navy fighter ace of the war. The Hellcats shot down
approximately 70 aircraft from this raid. Most of the aircraft which broke
through the combat air patrol were destroyed or driven off by the gunfire of
the Battle Line.
Nonetheless, a handful of the bombers succeeded in
attacking the American carriers. Six attacked Rear Admiral Montgomery's
group, making near-misses which caused casualties on two of the carriers.
Four of the six were shot down. A small group of torpedo aircraft attacked
Reeves' group just before midday, one launching a torpedo which exploded in
the wake of Reeves' flagship Enterprise. Three other torpedo-planes
attacked the light carrier Princeton, but were shot down.
In all 97 aircraft of this - Ozawa's second wave - failed
to return.
The third raid, consisting of 47 aircraft, came in from
the north. It was intercepted at 1300, some 50 miles out from the task
force, by 40 fighters. Seven Japanese planes were shot down. A few broke
through and made an ineffective attack on Harrill's group. Many others did
not press home their attacks. This raid therefore suffered less than the
others, and 40 of its aircraft managed to return to their carriers.
After this third assault there was a brief lull in the
battle. Several US carriers were able to secure from General Quarters, and
Mitscher took the opportunity to launch a search mission - one which was,
however, unsuccessful.
The fourth and final assault wave was launched from the
Japanese carriers between 1100 and 1130. This raid was given an incorrect
location for its targets. One group from this raid, failing to find anything
at the reported position, headed for the island of Rota to refuel, but
sighted Montgomery's task group by chance. 9 dive-bombers eluded the
American fighters and made attacks on carriers Wasp and Bunker
Hill, but failed to make any hits, and all but one of the attackers were
shot down. Another group, of 18 aircraft from the Japanese carrier
Zuikaku, lost half its number to the American fighters.
The
illustration at the head of this page is reproduced with thanks from
'Silvered Wings - the Aerial
Photography of Gordon Bain' (Airlife Publishing UK)
The largest group from this the fourth of Ozawa's raids -
49 aircraft - failed to locate any US ships and made for Guam. It was picked
up on radar, and the last Combat Air Patrol of the day - consisting of 12
Hellcats from light carrier Cowpens - was sent to intercept. The US
fighters came upon the Japanese planes as they were circling Orote Field
ready to land.
As the Cowpens aircraft went in to attack they
were joined by seven Hellcats from Essex, again led by McCampbell,
and eight from Hornet. These 27 US fighters shot down 30 of the 49
Japanese planes, and the 19 survivors which landed received heavy and
irreparable damage.
While Ozawa's air groups were being devastated in this
massacre his carriers had come under attack from American submarines.
The US Submarine Attacks
A few days before the battle Admiral Lockwood, commander
of Task Force 17 - the patrol submarines of the Central Pacific Force - had
positioned four of his boats to intercept the Japanese fleet. Two of these
located and attacked Ozawa's force on 19 June.
At 0816 Albacore sighted Ozawa's own carrier
division, and soon began an attack on the carrier most suitably placed,
which by chance was the Taiho, Ozawa's flagship - the Japanese Navy's
most modern and most strongly-constructed carrier. As Albacore was
about to fire a salvo of six torpedoes at Taiho her fire-control
computer failed, and her commanding officer, Commander J.W. Blanchard, was
forced to aim the salvo by visual judgment alone.
Taiho was than steaming at 27 knots. She had just
launched 42 aircraft, her component of the Japanese second wave against Task
Force 58. Four of Albacore's torpedoes were off-target. The pilot of
one of the recently-launched aircraft - Sakio Komatsu - sighted one of the
two which were heading for Taiho and heroically crashed his aircraft
on it, destroying the torpedo and losing his life in the process. But the
other torpedo struck the carrier on her starboard side near her
aviation-fuel tanks. Nonetheless the damage to Taiho at first
appeared not to be very serious.
Ozawa's Carrier Division also fell foul of the American
submarine Cavalla. Shokaku, one of the six carriers which had carried
out the attack on Pearl Harbor, was hit shortly before noon by three
torpedoes of a salvo of six which Cavalla had fired from the close
range of 1,000 yards. Fuel tanks on the carrier were ruptured by the
explosions, fires spread through the ship, and at about 1500 a bomb magazine
exploded, destroying her.
Meanwhile the flagship Taiho was falling victim to
poor damage-control. On the orders of an inexperienced damage-control
officer her ventilation system had been operated full-blast in an attempt to
clear explosive fumes from the ship. This instead this had the disastrous
effect of spreading the vapours throughout Taiho, and at 1532,
approximately half an hour after the explosion which sank Shokaku, Taiho
was herself wrecked by a huge explosion, and sank shortly after.
Albacore and Cavalla were both subjected to
heavy depth-charge attacks, but the submarines escaped without serious
damage.
Japanese and American Losses
Ozawa had committed 373 aircraft to his attacks and
searches. Only 130 of these returned to their carriers, and about 50 of the
Guam-based planes were shot down by Task Force 58. Other Japanese aircraft
were lost operationally, and yet more went down with the two carriers sunk
by the US submarines. In all the Japanese forces lost around 315 aircraft on
19 June.
Of the hundreds of US aircraft engaged in this great
battle only 23 were shot down, and 6 more lost operationally. Task Force 58
lost 29 aircrew and suffered 31 fatal casualties on the ships which were hit
or near-missed. In very few battles since medieval times, whether on land or
at sea, have losses been so one-sided.
The Final Phase - The Air Battle of 20 June
Task Force 58 pushed westwards
during the night of 19/20 June in order to attack the Japanese fleet, and at
dawn launched air searches. On the Japanese side there was great confusion
caused by the fact that Ozawa attempted to control his forces from the
destroyer Wakatsuki, to which he and his staff had transferred when
the Taiho had to be abandoned. The destroyer's communications were
inadequate for her to act as flagship, and at about 1300 on 20 June Ozawa
transferred to the large carrier Zuikaku (sister ship to the
Shokaku and as of 20 June the only survivor of the six carriers which
had attacked Pearl Harbor). It was only now that Ozawa learned of the
massacre of his air groups the day before, and that his force had only one
hundred aircraft still operational. Nonetheless he was determined to
continue the battle, believing that there were still considerable numbers of
Japanese aircraft operational on Rota and Guam. Ozawa intended to launch
further strikes on the following day, 21 June.
American searches failed, for most
of 20 June, to find the Japanese fleet, but eventually - at1540 - an Avenger
piloted by Lieutenant R.S. Nelson, from the veteran carrier Enterprise,
found Ozawa's force. Nelson's message reporting the contact was however
so garbled that Mitscher did not know what had been sighted or where. He
nonetheless decided to make an all-out strike when more information came in,
despite the fact that there were now only about 75 minutes to sunset, and
that the strike would therefore have to be recovered in darkness. By 1605
further reports from Lt. Nelson had given the Task Force 58 commander the
information needed.
At 1610 the aircrew manned their planes, and at 1621 the
carriers turned into the wind to launch the strike, which consisted of 216
aircraft. The launching was completed in the remarkably short time of eleven
minutes.
The attack went in at 1830. Ozawa had been able to put up
very few fighters to intercept - no more than 35 according to the American
pilots' later estimates, but these few were skilfully handled, and the
Japanese ships' anti-aircraft fire was intense.
The first ships sighted by the US strike were oilers, and
two of these were damaged so severely that they were later scuttled. The
carrier Hiyo was attacked by 4 Avengers from the light carrier
Belleau Wood and hit by at least one of their torpedoes. The carriers
Zuikaku, Junyo and Chiyoda were damaged by bombs, as was the
battleship Haruna. The torpedoed Hiyo later sank. Roughly 20
American aircraft were lost in this strike.
By nightfall on 20 June Ozawa had therefore lost three
carriers, including two of his finest ships, and of the 430 aircraft which
had been available to his force on the morning of 19 June only 35 were still
operational.
The Night Recovery
Twilight was closing in as the American attack ended, and
the aircrew were faced with the difficult and dangerous task of making a
landing on what proved to be an exceptionally dark night. They had flown
275-300 miles to the enemy fleet and had almost as long a return flight to
the US carriers. Their fuel was therefore dangerously low.
At 2045 the first returning planes began to circle over
Task Force 58. Mitscher - who invariably showed unusual concern for the
safety and well-being of his flyers - then took the decision to fully
illuminate the carriers, despite the risk of attack from submarines and
night-flying aircraft. All ships of the task force turned on their lights,
and the screening destroyers fired starshell throughout the recovery, which
lasted two hours. Despite these measures eighty of the returning aircraft -
with pilots neither trained nor equipped for night landing - were lost, some
crashing on flight decks, the majority going into the sea. But of the 209
aircrew participating in the 20 June strike 160 were rescued either during
the operation or in the following few days.
The End of Japanese Seaborne Airpower
At 2046 on 20 June Ozawa received orders from Admiral
Toyoda, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet, to withdraw from the Philippine Sea.
After the night recovery of Mitscher's aircraft the US task force moved
westwards in pursuit of the retreating Japanese, but the battle was over.
The two-day engagement had been the largest pure
carrier-versus-carrier battle in history, and was to be the last. The
immediate consequence of the Japanese defeat was the US capture of the
Marianas. This broke the Japanese inner line of defence, and meant that
American bombers based in the islands could now reach targets on Japan
itself. As a result of their huge losses of aircrew in the battle the
remnants of the Japanese seaborne air groups were never again able to
challenge the American fleet, and at the Leyte Gulf four months later the
Japanese carrier force - which had once dominated the Pacific War - was
reduced to playing the role of decoy, while the primary attacking role was,
of necessity, assigned to the Imperial Navy's battleships and their
attendant cruisers and destroyers.
Acknowledgments
The main source for this narrative was Samuel Eliot Morison's
"History of US Naval Operations in World War II" (Little, Brown & Co,
Boston)
- Volume VIII "New Guineau and the Marianas."
